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RESISTANCE TO THE 
SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN: 
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 
by David Charters 
In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in Decem-
ber 1979, many journalists and analysts expressed well-founded doubts about 
the prospects for effective opposition to the Soviet occupation forces. Six months 
later the resistance continues but the doubts persist. This article will attempt to 
analyse the anti-Soviet resistance to date, to examine the problems and pros-
pects confronting it in the months to come, and attempt to answer the question: 
is effective resistance to Soviet domination possible? 
What is Resistance? 
M.R.D. Foot, authority on the European resistance, starts his recent study of 
the subject with the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary definition: "an organ-
ized underground movement in a country occupied by enemy forces carried on 
with the assistance of armed fighters for the purpose of frustrating and damag-
ing the .occupying power."1 The principal political task is subversion, which 
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includes, by Foot's classification, four subordinate activities: sabotage; attacks 
on troops and individuals; politics; and insurrection.2 The emphasis on subver-
sion is significant because it establishes limits on the role and the realistically 
attainable objectives of resistance; it does not include liberation. Only rarely, 
and arguably at that (Yugoslavia being a case in point), did the European resis-
tance gain strength sufficient to "liberate" a country, to move from the military 
into the political sphere, without the massive infusion of allied forces. This is an 
important consideration in the context of Afghanistan; a "counter-invasion" by 
external allies is highly unlikely and those who might assume that the Afghans 
can liberate themselves without such assistance would do well to recall the 
historical record. Having said that, it should be stressed that resistance is by no 
means futile. In the military dimension resistance operations can raise the 
human and material costs of occupation to severe levels, causing a correspond-
ing decline in morale and fighting efficiency among the enemy forces. Enemy 
lines of communication may be harassed, forcing the occupation forces to 
deploy on internal security duties troops which might be used for offensive 
operations elsewhere. The resistance groups can gather and pass to their 
external allies valuable intelligence on the occupation forces.3 Equally, if not 
more important, politically a resistance movement can provide a focus for the 
national will to oppose the occupation. Assistance from allies and successful 
resistance actions may restore national self-respect and confidence and revive 
the desire and ability to assume responsibility for government after liberation.4 
Conditions Favouring Resistance 
Recent history affords numerous examples of opposition to totalitarian 
regimes, foreign occupation and colonial rule. In some cases opposition flared 
into open, violent resistance; in others it remained muted, if it was not silenced 
altogether. Clearly, resistance will flourish only under certain conditions, which 
may include any or all of the following:5 
1. A cause — something to resist, such as political repression, foreign 
occupation, ethnic, religious or other discrimination, corrupt and/or 
ineffective government, modernization. 
2. A population willing to be persuaded that armed rebellion is the best (or 
only) means of removing the occupation forces. 
3. Alternative non-violent channels for resolving grievances are either non-
existent, blocked or insufficiently developed to accommodate them. 
4. Development or existence of a cultural tradition which accepts or 
encourages the use of violence to resolve grievances. 
5. Failure of a government system — corruption, division, loss of initiative 
among governing elites and administrative institutions, break-down of 
essential services — including in the population a lack of confidence and 
a general decline in respect for authority. 
6. Techniques of repression employed by the government which are 
sufficient to increase agitation induced by other factors but insufficient 
to deter further violence. 
7. Emergence or existence of a political leadership and organization willing 
and able to exploit the situation. 
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8. An adequate and renewable supply of weapons appropriate to the 
terrain and to the technical abilities of the resistance. 
9. "Geo-political factors" — terrain which favours the resistance while 
hampering the operations of the enemy; the existence of areas of 
minimal government control; technical, political or moral limitations on 
the government's use of force; regional superpower competition for 
influence. 
This comprehensive, if imperfect, model offers a broad framework within which 
to consider the prospects for the Afghan Resistance. 
The Afghan Resistance 
BACKGROUND 
The Afghan resistance movement grew out of widespread opposition to 
"reforms" initiated by the Marxist government of Nur Mohammed Taraki, 
who seized power in a coup d'état in April 1978. The government's efforts to 
reduce the power of the "Mullahs" (religious leaders) and to emancipate women 
deeply offended the conservative, devout Islamic tribes. Moreover, fiercely 
independent and traditionally rebellious they resented the government's close 
association with the atheistic Russians and the growing Soviet presence in the 
country. Opposition flared into violence almost immediately and by June 1979 
some 2,000 Soviet "advisers", provided under the terms of the Soviet-Afghan 
treaty of December 1978, were assisting the Soviet-trained and -armed Afghan 
army in the suppression of resistance. Reports received since indicate that the 
repression was brutal: thousands of Afghans died in the crushing of an uprising 
in Herat in March 1979, and the following month Soviet advisers directed 
Afghan troops and police in a massacre of an estimated 1,000 men at the village 
of Kerala, northeast of Kabul. In September 1979 Amnesty International 
reported that the Taraki regime had imprisoned some 30,000 people and had 
executed at least 2,000 "political prisoners". Far from crushing the resistance 
the repression appeared to give it greater strength and momentum; by the 
autumn of 1979 the resistance appeared to control much of the countryside 
outside the main cities.6 This was the military situation which, combined with 
political factors in Kabul and on the international scene, induced the Soviet 
Union to intervene in December 1979. Troops were flown into the capital and 
armoured columns crossed Afghanistan's northern borders. Today there are an 
estimated 80,000 Soviet troops in the country, and the resistance has had to 
challenge this powerful force as well as the Marxist-led Afghan Army. 
RESISTANCE OPERATIONS 
Afghan resistance operations since the Soviet invasion have followed the 
pattern suggested by Foot. First, the movement sabotaged power lines, coal and 
copper mines and intimidated farmers to convince them to reduce the spring 
grain planting.7 Secondly, the resistance carried out constant attacks on Soviet 
and Afghan troops and on individuals thought to be collaborating with the 
regime. Owing to government censorship and the consequent difficulty in 
acquiring accurate information, the effect of these attacks can only be 
estimated: in April the U.S. Department of State placed Soviet casualties at 
about 500 per week, totalling an estimated 7,000 since the invasion.8 The 
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political dimension of resistance activities fell into three distinct but related 
areas: attempts to organize a united front for coordinating resistance activities; 
propaganda; and subversion of the Afghan army. The resistance had consider-
able success in the latter area: by February, as many as 40,000 men of the 
Afghan army may have defected to the insurgents, taking their weapons and 
equipment with them. In some cases, complete units fought the Soviets outright, 
while others refused to carry out offensive operations against the resistance 
movement.9 Finally, after considerable organization the resistance movement 
launched a major urban insurrection on February 21st. The uprising began in 
Kabul with a general strike which spread to ten other cities and towns the next 
day. Demonstrators in Kabul marched in the streets, rioted, and stole weapons 
from police stations. Soviet and Afghan troops using armoured vehicles and 
helicopter gunships crushed the uprising after six days, leaving 350-500 Afghans 
dead and many more wounded. Similar incidents occurred on a smaller scale at 
the end of April, and in May and June.10 
STATE OF THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE 
Generally speaking, conditions in Afghanistan favour the resistance move-
ment. What began as a violent reaction to Marxist modernization plans stif-
fened by political repression has, with the Soviet invasion, broadened to become 
a war of national liberation. The fact that six months after the Soviet invasion 
the resistance shows no signs of stopping demonstrates the depth and wide-
spread appeal of the liberation cause. This should not be surprising. First, the 
Afghan tribes have a long history of opposition to foreign invaders and to any 
form of central government. Even in recent times central government institu-
tions have not replaced fully local, tribal and religious authority in the rural 
areas. In fact, tribal religious fervour provided the propaganda vehicle for 
mobilizing opposition to the Marxist regime." Secondly, the tribes traditionally 
have used violence to resolve differences and to repel foreign forces and the 
rugged mountain ranges and deep valleys which dominate much of the country 
favour the guerrilla warfare tactics adopted naturally by the Afghan tribes. The 
terrain confines the highly-mechanized Soviet Army to a few roads or to move-
ment by air and leaves many areas of minimal government control.12 
The resistance movement is, however, not without its difficulties. At first 
glance the most serious of these appears to be the lack of a recognized leader and 
a cohesive organization. One estimate places 60 different factions in opposition 
to the government;13 even amongst the largest and most influential groups there 
are tribal and religious differences which preclude the easy formation of a united 
resistance movement. One observer has suggested that this may be a product of 
the predominant influence of the Sunni Islam sect in Afghanistan. The Sunni 
sect lacks the Shiite's hierarchial authority structure of powerful Mullahs and 
Ayatullahs. Consequently, Islam has never been as strong a unifying force in 
Afghanistan as it is in predominantly Shiite Iran.14 It may be fair to suggest as 
well that, by its very nature, a spontaneous resistance movement is bound to be 
poorly organized, at least in the early stages. The consequences of disunity are 
several: first, the Islamic nations of the Middle East, obvious allies in the 
struggle against the Soviet Union, have demonstrated reluctance to support the 
Afghan resistance in anything stronger than moral terms. They provide financ-
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ing for the refugees who have fled to Pakistan, recognizing that some of the 
funds and benefits will go indirectly to the resistance. Only Egypt has gone so far 
as to train resistance fighters and to provide them with arms.15 It may be that 
these likely supporters will withhold total support until a recognized leader and 
a coherent organization appear. Secondly, what little political strength that the 
Karmai government has rests on the power of the Soviet army and on the dis-
unity of the opposition. The longer the disunity continues, the greater will be the 
ability of the Soviet Union to "divide and conquer", destroying the individual 
organizations piecemeal. Finally, there is no generally recognized "rival state" 
along the lines of Sinn Féin during the Irish rebellion of 1919-21, nor is there a 
government-in-exile, such as the Free French in the Second World War. Thus, 
while the rebels clearly are able to remove temporarily government control in 
certain areas, and are capable of organizing popular uprisings of limited dura-
tion, it appears that they have not been able to build a parallel hierarchy which 
would be able to make that important move from the military into the political 
sphere, to fill the power vacuum if the Karmal government collapses. 
This limitation is related directly, if only partially, to the second problem: 
weapons. The supply of arms, either purchased in Pakistan or captured from 
government forces, was probably adequate until the Soviet invasion. But 
weapons acquired in Pakistan must be smuggled slowly across a frontier now 
made hazardous by airmobile Soviet forces. Furthermore, many of the resis-
tance weapons are outdated, but more modern arms are expensive and, in any 
case, few members of the resistance have demonstrated the technical capacity 
necessary to use them. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is reported 
to have opened a conduit of Soviet-made weapons to the resistance fighters in 
January, but the scale of supply is not known; the fact that the rebels complain 
still about a shortage of weapons indicates that it is probably limited."' The slow 
rate of attrition of Soviet helicopters indicates that at least one crucial weapon 
— the man-portable surface-to-air missile — is not yet getting through. In 
quantity, such weapons could make the narrow mountain passes "hell on earth" 
for Soviet pilots, thereby reducing the Soviet army's air mobility. Anti-tank 
rocket launchers of simple design and, above all, land mines, could do the same 
for vehicle-borne forces, tied as they are to vulnerable roads, forced by snipers to 
drive "buttoned up" with limited visibility. 
Echoing, perhaps unwittingly, Churchill's famous comment to Roosevelt, 
one Afghan spokesman said in January, "Give us the tools, and we will finish 
the job."'7 Weapons alone will not bring liberation, but appropriate weapons in 
quantity could raise the human costs of the Soviet occupation to levels which 
would preclude consolidation of the Soviet position in Afghanistan or its 
exploitation for further adventures. 
Finally, geo-political factors still favour the Soviet Union. It shares a 
common border with Afghanistan, making reinforcement and re-supply of 
forces relatively easy. Although the strategic political fallout from the Soviet 
invasion remains "hot news" the Soviets have managed through strict censor-
ship, harassment and expulsion of western news media, to reduce the profile of 
the occupation itself and the resistance to it to the status of secondary news. Few 
western newsmen are either willing or able to make the dangerous trek overland 
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to see the situation for themselves. Consequently, reports of fighting are 
sketchy: resistance claims of victory may be dismissed easily as exaggerations 
and it remains difficult to confirm reports of Soviet atrocities or the use of 
chemical weapons."* This serves Soviet interests in two ways: first, it prevents 
the west from gaining the kind of moral ascendancy which, in the hands of the 
Soviet Union and its allies, imposed moral and political limits on American 
behavior in Vietnam. It is hard to condemn what you cannot see; brutal repres-
sion can continue out of the camera's eye. Secondly, the lack of credible spokes-
men for the opposition may, in time, confer legitimacy upon the Soviet accounts 
of the conflict, and thus, indirectly, upon the Soviet position as a whole. Both of 
these factors will be important if the Soviet Union is to attempt to disarm 
western anger and to forestall effective sanctions; they are crucial elements in 
the current Soviet "peace offensive" aimed at "normalizing" east-west relations 
and legitimizing the status quo in Afghanistan.19 
Conclusions 
The prospects for the Afghan resistance are grim indeed. The passage of time 
is the greatest legitimizer of all and the pressure on President Carter to reopen 
the lines of communication to Moscow, to restore "détente", may be a good 
indication of how far the process has gone already.20 In a world almost desperate 
for peace at any price, is there any hope for liberation of Afghanistan, or at the 
very least, effective resistance to Soviet domination? The answer must remain at 
present a qualified "yes", because it rests on the willingness of the west to give 
unqualified moral, political and material support to the Afghan resistance. Such 
support is not yet forthcoming, either because we have already accepted the 
eventual triumph of a "new order" in Afghanistan, or because we are afraid to 
stand by our consciences and admit that we are involved. Neither position is 
defensible in moral or strategic terms. The west need not feel guilty for support-
ing a genuine anti-imperialist struggle and for opposing strongly on moral 
grounds Soviet intervention in a foreign country. Furthermore, sustained 
support for the resistance could ensure that the occupation is so costly for the 
Soviets in political, human and material terms that they would be unable to 
exploit their position there and would be reluctant to attempt such an operation 
again. 
The Price 
A decision to support the Afghan resistance should not be made lightly, for it 
would involve serious commitments for the west. First, the commitment would 
have to be long-term, not subject to changes at the whim of one party or minister 
or another. It is important for moral credibility that policy remain consistent: if 
the Soviet occupation is regarded as immoral, illegal and unacceptable now, it 
must remain so. This in turn would require political will to maintain the com-
mitment for years if necessary, to live with the political, economic and human 
costs, and to convince the western public that there are no easy solutions, no 
instant results. It may be too much to expect that President Carter's State of 
the Union address in January was intended to prepare the nation — and the 
western alliance — for just such a long-haul struggle. 
Secondly, the west must be prepared to accept a supporting role, not a direct-
ing one. Command and control would have to remain with the resistance move-
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ment itself; it cannot be run from Washington. Furthermore, the west must 
avoid the temptation to do "all or nothing". A long-haul commitment precludes 
"quick fixes" and the problems of the resistance cannot be solved simply by 
throwing money at them. The commitment in dollar terms need not be high, 
therefore, just constant. If the Middle Eastern members of OPEC could 
contribute directly to the purchasing of arms for the resistance, the west and 
other nations could play a valuable supportive role as the arsenal of the freedom 
struggle. 
Third, in order to stimulate effective resistance the west might have to support 
the leader of the party which promises the most effective campaign. The aim of 
their struggle is to remove foreign domination. The character of the regime 
which might follow a Soviet pullout is a matter to be resolved by the Afghans 
themselves. 
Finally, support should be justified on moral terms. If the west could be seen 
to be backing a resistance movement because the struggle is morally correct, it 
would obviate the need to mask our support under a cloak of secrecy. 
President Carter's description of the Afghanistan situation as "the most 
serious crisis since the Second World War"21 was unnecessarily melodramatic. 
But the implications are serious enough. To do nothing in the face of naked 
aggression might ease the short-term crisis but the long-term consequences 
would be very dangerous: in a future crisis over, for example, the Persian Gulf 
oil fields, the west could be reduced to a choice between appeasement or nuclear 
war, neither of which would protect western interests. By choosing the middle 
course now, the west could make the Soviets pay a discouraging price for their 
aggression without committing either the west or the nations of the region to an 
all-out war. For such security, economic sanctions, an Olympic boycott and a 
long-term commitment to the Afghan freedom struggle seem a very small price 
to pay. In closing, it is worth recalling the advice of Edmund Burke: "The only 
thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing."22 
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POST-REFERENDUM QUEBEC — 
THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT 
by 
Micheal J. Kelly and Thomas H. Mitchell 
For more than 20 years now English Canada has been anxiously following 
the progress of political change in the province of Quebec. By nearly every 
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